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Abstract—Background: Research has shown that users do not
use encryption and fail to understand the security properties
which encryption provides. We hypothesise that one contributing
factor to failed user understanding is poor explanations of
security properties, as the technical descriptions used to explain
encryption focus on structural mental models.
Purpose: We methodically generate metaphors for end-to-end
(E2E) encryption that cue functional models and develop and test
the metaphors’ effect on users’ understanding of E2E-encryption.
Data: Transcripts of 98 interviews with users of various E2E-
encrypted messaging apps and 211 survey responses.
Method: First, we code the user interviews and extract promising
explanations. These user-provided explanations inform the cre-
ation of metaphors using a framework for generating metaphors
adapted from literature. The generated metaphors and existing
industry descriptions of E2E-encryption are analytically evalu-
ated. Finally, we design and conduct a survey to test whether
exposing users to these descriptions improves their understanding
of the functionality provided by E2E-encrypted messaging apps.
Results: While the analytical evaluation showed promising results,
none of the descriptions tested in the survey improve understand-
ing; descriptions frequently cue users in a way that undoes their
previously correct understanding. Metaphors developed from
user language are better than existing industry descriptions, in
that ours cause less harm.
Conclusion: Creating explanatory metaphors for encryption tech-
nologies is hard. Short statements that attempt to cue mental
models do not improve participants’ understanding. Better solu-
tions should build on our methodology to test a variety of potential
metaphors, to understand both the improvement and harm that
metaphors may elicit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of cryptography has expanded from benefiting
primarily the military to securing systems for the general pub-
lic [1]. For example, widely used messaging applications such
as WhatsApp and Telegram have embraced the use of end-to-
end (E2E) encryption. This recent flourishing of technology
gives non-expert users free access to encrypted person-to-
person communication. That general users can take advantage
of encryption is however in question - in 1999, Whitten and
Tygar [2] claimed that cryptographic details confuse users.
Concerns persist about the usability of E2E-encryption, and
continue to generate a considerable body of research [3]–[7].
Saltzer and Schroeder [8] have long encouraged designers
to bridge the gap between a user’s mental image of a protection
system and the system’s specification language. However, few
attempts have been made to address this gap. Application
properties are communicated to users in technical jargon,
potentially obstructing their comprehension of security features
(including encryption, which itself is a technical cryptographic
term). The focus of communication efforts appears to be to
teach users how the system works, with the tacit assumption
that improved understanding will allow users to complete their
tasks. In “Analogy Considered Harmful” [9], Halasz and
Moran argue that analogies by themselves are insufficient for
teaching people about computing systems. We expand their
ideas to metaphors and provide empirical evidence.
Beyond cryptographic tools, systems can be explained
to users through accustomed metaphors [10], which can be
extended into design models. DiSessa [11] distinguishes be-
tween a ‘structural’ and a ‘functional’ mental model. A struc-
tural model provides a detailed understanding of the system,
whereas a functional model provides certain properties of the
system which are necessary to complete a real-life task.1 After
Whitten and Tygar [2] concluded in their ‘Johnny’ paper that
the ‘key’ metaphor was misleading, Whitten [13] responded by
visually transforming the ‘key’ metaphor for a secure e-mailing
tool. This was effectively a revised structural model intended to
cue users’ understanding of cryptographic functions. Whitten
does not question the appropriateness of the ‘key’ metaphor
itself, nor whether the strategy of cuing structural models will
lead to better user outcomes.
There is a dearth of studies that specifically address the
issue of inadequate terminology and metaphors to describe
cryptographic systems such as E2E-encryption. Furthermore,
no attempts have been made to generate and test metaphors in
a comparable, repeatable manner. Here we break this impasse
and adapt HCI methodology to rigorously generate metaphors
for E2E-encryption. We aim to generate metaphors that cue
functional mental models in users [11]. Rather than requiring
users to explicitly learn all the relevant security tasks, we
aim to cue users’ already-existing models. Metaphors leverage
these existing models to approximate a working mental model
for performing a specific task.
1A functional model is similar to a task-action mapping model – defined by
Young [12] as an internalised representation of the system to the real-world
task which users have to perform.
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The research aims of this paper are: (1) to rigorously
generate metaphors that cue functional mental models, and
(2) to test the effectiveness of these metaphors with users.
We present a modified application of the framework for
re-engineering metaphors by Alty et al. [14]. Our first contri-
bution is our proposed methodology which serves as a guide
for the generation of explanatory metaphors. It suggests a
combination of analytic evaluation and empirical testing which
provides useful evidence on the efficacy of the metaphors. Fur-
thermore, we generate five new metaphors for E2E-encryption,
further refined to a set of three. Thirdly, we test these three
metaphors and two currently used explanatory metaphors
through a survey of users of communication apps containing
E2E-encryption capabilities.
The results of the survey show evidence that currently used
metaphors harm users’ understanding of secure messaging app
functionality such as E2E-encryption. Moreover, our results
show that metaphors generated from user language do not
cause such harm to user understanding. However, our results
are negative in that none of our new metaphors actually cue
a ‘correct’ mental model in users. Extended metaphors may
be needed to more effectively cue functional mental models
of E2E-encryption. Our methodology can be used to better
understand both the improvement and harm that metaphors
may cause to users’ understanding of E2E-encryption.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The upcoming
section summarises a corpus of metaphor research in security
and identifies the research gap which motivates the paper. We
then describe our four-step methodology in Section IV, fol-
lowed by a summary of our results in Section V. Our findings
are further examined in Section VI, before we conclude with
recommendations and make suggestions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
We present related work in two areas: usable E2E-
encryption cryptography and understanding of user mental
models in security.
A. Usable E2E-encryption Cryptography
The effectiveness of E2E-encryption solutions for non-
expert users continues to be studied in the research community
[3]–[7]. In ‘Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt’ [2], Whitten and Tygar
found that PGP 5.0’s graphical user interface (GUI) was not as
usable as advertised. Most participants were unable to correctly
send an encrypted e-mail. The authors concluded that PGP 5.0
had an insufficiently usable GUI – including a signature and
pen metaphor – that led to dangerous errors. Whitten sought
to correct this in studying Lime, a proposed secure e-mailing
tool [13]. Her argument was that (i) effective metaphors for
security are lacking, and (ii) metaphors need to map to critical
process information if they are to support users. Regardless,
Whitten stayed focused on structural components of the mental
model, such as keys and locks in the right places.
There is no consensus on what exactly should be improved,
although technical solutions have not been sufficient. Garfinkel
and Miller [15] conclude PGP failed due to inadequate key
certification model, not its GUI. However, even after automat-
ing these key-based tasks, they found PGP security problems
remained. Subsequently, Sheng et al. [16] continued to identify
key certification and UI issues in PGP. Fahl et al. [3] find
users need to feel security features ‘do something’. However,
this is a delicate balance, as Ruoti et al. [17] find users are
confused when security details are too transparent. Ruoti et
al. [18, p. 4] advocated ‘approachable descriptions of public-
key cryptography’. Most modern E2E-encryption messaging
apps instead hide such structural details from the user. This
design decision perhaps accepts a failure – that indoctrinating
users with structural details did not work well.
But all is not well with modern apps. There are two modes
of E2E-encryption underlying IM applications opportunistic
and authenticated E2E-encryption [5]. Users are often unaware
of the difference. In response, Abu-Salma et al. suggest that
‘security properties and threats should be framed in terms
that users can understand’ [7, p. 15]. When terminology is
inappropriate, the incidence of insecure behaviour increases.
Next, we explore explicit attempts at providing for users an
approachable description of encryption.
B. Metaphors and Mental Models in Security
There are few attempts to find appropriate terminology
to engage users with computer systems. Clark and Sasse
[10] applied conceptual design to create a user interface for
the Session Directory Tool (sdr). Users’ existing knowledge
and context of use was elicited, identifying metaphors which
were then adapted into a design model. The other major
work is Whitten [13], in which she develops a technique for
tailoring visual security metaphors. Whitten visually tailors
the traditionally used public-key cryptography metaphors and
incorporates them into a new secure e-mailing tool. She tests
her metaphors empirically by providing users with a detailed
description of Lime accompanied by the visual metaphors.
Results show that users do not particularly perform better when
using Lime rather than PGP, despite the tailored metaphors.
Following Whitten, other authors have proposed visual
metaphors for secure e-mailing tools. Roth et al. [19] suggested
mail envelopes and postcards. Tong et al. [20] proposed
metaphors arguably couched in the jargon of domain experts,
such as key, lock, seal and imprint. Lausch et al. [21] revisited
postcard and mail envelope metaphors, but extended them to
include a torn letter to signify a corrupted e-mail. Although the
authors presented promising survey results, their participants
were ‘privacy aware’ and ‘tech-savvy.’ There is little indica-
tion such metaphors similarly impact non-experts, ignorant of
encryption technology operation.
Unlike Whitten, Clark and Sasse involved users in gener-
ating metaphors [10]. They found that a metaphor grounded
in users’ own experiences could leverage simple models of
understanding to support users who lack the knowledge of
how underlying systems work. Users’ tool facility then ap-
proaches the competence of an experienced user with domain
knowledge.
Users’ mental models of a system are usually simpler than
the real-world system [22], [23]. Johnson-Laird’s theory of
mental models originates in cognitive psychology, and is used
in human-computer interaction (HCI) [10], [23] and recently,
security. When generating metaphors, one must consider users’
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previous knowledge of the intended system. Renaud et al. ad-
vise security researchers to ‘nurture and foster comprehensive
and complete mental models of E2E to ensure that users want
to encrypt, know how to encrypt and, most importantly, do
encrypt’ [24, p. 17].
Users tend not to have an accurate model of security
threats or security tools. Wash [25] finds home users often
choose to ignore advice from security experts about threats.
User understanding of threats such as bot-nets bears little
resemblance to the technical reality. Abu-Salma et al. [7] find
users have poor mental models of secure communications, how
encryption works, and E2E-encryption.
There is evidence that media channels are finding infor-
mation security terminology, and cryptographic terminology
in particular, a barrier to communicating to their audiences.
The ‘Planet Money’ podcast [26] for example discusses ‘some
Russian hackers using an electronic device to mess with the
outcomes of a slot machine’. ‘The Ceremony’ [27] describes
use of Zcash crypto-currency as a ceremony containing math
and wizardry. These efforts to make security accessible are
well-intentioned. However, the media’s explanatory goals are
different from those of practitioners. One is not a substitute
for another. This may explain why the media is potentially
‘dumbing down’ the technology rather than providing their
audience with the skills to move ahead in a more secure way.
‘The Analogies Project’ [28] blog also makes an effort to
explain security concepts to users through analogies such as
Infosec is Like Sun Protection [29]. However, the majority of
these analogies do not serve the purpose of an analogy because
they do not cue understanding of security concepts in a self-
contained manner. Practitioners should aim to provide adequate
explanatory metaphors.
Twenty years ago, Clark and Sasse [10] argued for adequate
explanatory metaphors as an aim. Specifically, to enable novice
users of encrypted communications to appear skillful in their
use of complex tools. The practitioner community has yet
to find the right metaphors that enable such skilled use. We
present a methodology for improving the community’s pursuit
of this difficult task. We also take a different direction from
past work that focuses on instilling detailed structural models;
instead we attempt to cue functional models.
III. BACKGROUND
This section provides a brief background of Alty et al.’s
[14] metaphor evaluation framework and the specific parts of
the framework that we use in this paper.
A. The Framework
The framework that we apply consists of an extensive
process for generating and evaluating metaphors at the user
interface (UI) [14]. Due to contextual differences, we make
some alterations to the framework and apply a concise ver-
sion. For example, in Alty et al.’s scenario, some of the
steps involve the integration of the metaphor into the user
interface of a system. Although our study has user-metaphor
interaction, it lacks user-metaphor interaction through the UI
of a secure messaging app. Thus, the steps that we apply
from the framework are: identification of system functionality;
generation and description of potential metaphors; analysis
of metaphor-system pairings, and; evaluation. We identify
the system functionality in IV, elaborate the generation and
description of the metaphors in IV-A and IV-B, and show their
evaluation in IV-D.
B. Analysis of metaphor-system pairings
The matrix used to analyse metaphor-system pairings was
originally presented by Anderson et al. [30] within the above
mentioned framework and it is based on their vast experience
of creating metaphors for telecommunications systems. Corre-
sponding to the aim of the framework, it serves as a guide to
software designers developing metaphors to describe computer
systems. We have recreated the contents of the original matrix
in Table I below. The authors borrow terminology from psy-
cholinguistic literature – they use the word vehicle to represent
the metaphor and the word system to refer to the computer
system being analysed [30].
TABLE I. INTERACTION BETWEEN SET OF VEHICLE FEATURES AND
SET OF SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY — REPRODUCED FROM [30]
V+ V-
S+
Those features provided by the
system and supported by the
vehicle (S+V+)
Those features provided by the
system but not supported by the
vehicle (S+V-)
S-
Features implied by the vehicle but
not supported by the system
(S-V+)
Features not implied by the
vehicle and not supported by the
system (S-V-)
Brostoff et al. [31] refactor the original matrix shown
above, and apply it within the field of security. They refer
to it as The Metaphor Evaluation Matrix – the word ‘vehicle’
is substituted with the word ‘metaphor’. We adopt Brostoff
et al.’s version of the matrix and change it accordingly (see
IV-C).
IV. METHODOLOGY
Our methodology consists of four parts:
1) Using interview transcripts to explore potential user ex-
planations that can be used as competent metaphors
(Section IV-A)
2) Applying a modified version of Alty et al.’s [14] frame-
work to generate new metaphors (Section IV-B)
3) Analytically evaluating the new metaphors through the
same framework in order to select promising ones (Sec-
tion IV-C)
4) Designing and conducting a survey for testing whether
the selected new metaphors cue better understanding of
E2E-encryption in the context of secure messaging apps
(Section IV-D)
Before we describe these four parts in detail, we must make
a choice of definitions. Alty et al. [14] use the term ‘system’
to refer to the computer system to be described through
a metaphor. In this paper, the system is E2E-encryption.
Our baseline definition for E2E-encryption is taken from
RFC 4949, the Internet Security Glossary:
“Continuous protection of data that flows between
two points in a network, effected by encrypting data
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when it leaves its source, keeping it encrypted while
it passes through any intermediate computers (such
as routers), and decrypting it only when it arrives at
the intended final destination” [32, p. 121].
We also must define which criteria of the system are most
salient and important. We attempt to strike a balance between
a definition that is detailed enough to cover the main purposes
of E2E-encryption, and also sufficiently simple for relatively
quick analytic assessment by a prospective researcher. For
example, in order to implement E2E-encryption, the developer
must make decisions about key management, such as forward
secrecy, and traffic analysis resistance, such as by traffic
padding. Assessment regimes such as NIST’s key management
recommendations [33] and security engineering recommenda-
tions [34] provide a great amount of detail. However, we can-
not evaluate metaphors on the details of many-hundred pages
of recommendations. Our goal was to identify properties that
allow users to reach their security goals when interacting with
a secure messaging app. We focus on E2E-encryption itself,
not resisting traffic analysis or the extant threat ecosystem.
Measuring and effectively cuing user understanding in these
three areas is material for future work. We identify the core
evaluation criteria as:
Safe Implementation: The contents of any message or
phone-call should not be retrievable without knowledge
of the key
Confidentiality: Transmitted data should appear unintelligi-
ble to anyone outside the conversation
Coverage: Data should always be encrypted from its source
to its destination
Authentication: The contents of any message or phone-call
should not be retrievable by an adversary in the middle,
masquerading as the intended recipient
Key Management: The key should merely be shared by the
two trusted endpoints
A. Interviews with users of E2E-encrypted messaging apps
We conduct secondary thematic coding of interview tran-
scripts originally analysed in three separate user studies, for the
purpose of extracting candidate metaphor topics. Study 1 [7]
explores user behaviour, perception, and understanding of
secure communications (58 transcripts). Study 2 [6] explores
user adoption and understanding of Telegram and evaluates the
tool’s user interface (20 transcripts). Study 3 [35] captures user
perceptions of WhatsApp’s security properties in a mock-up
containing modifications of certain features (20 transcripts).
We extract user descriptions of encryption and E2E-
encryption which are independently coded by three researchers
for completeness or incompleteness as well as technical or non-
technical accuracy. We assess the inter-coder agreement for
the coding of the encryption and E2E-encryption quotations
separately. Krippendorff’s alpha [36] coefficient is 0.612 for
encryption, and 0.723 for E2E-encryption. Generally, a coeffi-
cient above 0.66 is considered sufficiently reliable. However,
since for the set of encryption quotations our coefficient is
below 0.66, we look at pairwise numbers which highlight a
deficiency of one coder. Therefore, we finalise the codebook
by taking the majority agreement and including codes on which
at least two coders agree. Our final codebook consists of 183
TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEW CODES
Encryption E2E-Encryption
Lack of knowledge 25 9
Incorrect technical description 10 2
Incomplete technical description 9 5
Sufficient technical description 0 2
Incorrect non-technical description 43 9
Incomplete non-technical description 43 16
Sufficient non-technical description 8 2
valid quotations. The distribution of the codes is shown in
Table II.
The quotations from our codebook further justify the need
for exploring alternative explanatory metaphors that cue better
understanding of E2E-encryption in users. From the quotations
attempting to explain E2E-encryption, there were only four
descriptions which are labelled as ‘sufficient’ by all three
coders.
The quotations coded as sufficient technical descriptions are:
1) “Err my understanding of it from what I’ve been told
anyway is that it is erm the messages are encrypted at
both ends. So it’s like if I’m sending a message it encrypts
the message sends it to the other user and then they
can decrypt it rather than anything being sent over plain
text, so no keys are passed across plain text or anything.
Erm and it’s just ... it’s yeah it’s more difficult to crack
because anyone intercepting the message needs to break
it somewhere along the way there’s no way to see it.”
2) “It means when I send it, it will be coded in some
password and when my contact receives it, it will be
decoded and no one can steal the message in between
I guess.”
The quotations coded as sufficient non-technical descriptions
are:
1) “According to my limited understanding, is a security kind
of system where only you and the receiver would be able
to read the messages and nobody could intercept.”
2) “Whoever I’ve sent the message to, so here only my
contact can see what I’ve written, but anyone else other
than me or my contact can’t, I think.”
These four statements indicate some end-users can produce
adequate explanations. Unfortunately, none seem like a clear
way to convey better mental models. The technical descriptions
just use the jargon from the industry adequately; we will test
this approach by testing metaphors used in apps with E2E-
encryption. The two non-technical descriptions each have two
important features – correctly identifying the endpoints as the
sender and receiver, and that no one else can intercept the
message. These features will recur in the metaphors we create.
However, there is not much in the statements, so there is little
to concretely inspire our metaphor creation.
The three-annotator coding of the user descriptions was
also used to develop an awareness of the content of the data,
and to develop a useful categorisation of potential metaphors.
The non-technical descriptions are re-coded by one researcher
for keywords that serve for generating metaphors. Table III
displays the keywords used.
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B. Generation and description of E2E-Encryption metaphors
Alty et al. [14] propose several approaches for generating
metaphors. We adopted three of these approaches: Design
Metaphors, Brainstorming and Extension. Design Metaphors
emphasises the role of users as a useful source of metaphors.
Users often apply familiar metaphors from their everyday life
to their language to aid their understanding of a system when
undertaking a task [14]. Similarly, when some participants of
the user studies describe encryption or E2E-encryption, they
rely on familiar terminology to aid their understanding of the
system. Thus, we use the coded keywords when generating
some of the new metaphors through the framework.
Brainstorming suggests mapping real-life functionalities
to the functionalities of the technical system in order to
identify potential metaphors. Finally, Extension promotes the
idea of recycling metaphors that are currently used by sim-
ilar computer systems and extending them in a manner that
appropriates the metaphor to the new system.
We introduce five new metaphors in total. All metaphors
are produced through one of the three above mentioned ap-
proaches. The metaphors Special Language and Treasure Hunt
are a product of the Design Metaphor approach, the metaphors
Colours and Banknote are a product of the Brainstorming
approach, whereas Owl is a product of the Extension approach.
Special Language: Messages and calls with this person will
be translated to a special language for which only the two
of you know the dictionary. Participants used the word
‘language’ to refer to encryption. Thus, this metaphor
reflects participants’ statements:
• “...information is sent over the internet, but it’s en-
crypted, so sensitive information is being sent in a
different language, it’s not being sent as is.”
• “...you have written something and encryption means
that, yes yes it’s like turning the language into some-
thing else for reading the other device...”
Treasure Hunt: Messages and calls exchanged with this
person are like a treasure hidden in a place to which
only the two of you know the map. This metaphor is
also generated based on participant language referring to
encryption as a message in a box or a message that can
be unlocked:
• “...I think it’s in a box or something according to my
understanding...”
• “So what I think it’s more like hiding your what’s inside
the way that you know something is delivered but you
don’t know what’s inside of the box.”
• ‘...You need a password to unlock the message?...”
Colours: Messages and calls you exchange with this person
are like colours. Before sending them, you mix them with
another colour, known only by you two. Nobody else
can retrieve them unless they know the secret colour.
We generate this metaphor with the purpose of eliciting
participants’ mental models through every day talk [37].
The concept of colours is relatively simple and familiar
to a general public of most ages.
Banknote: Messages and phone calls shared with this person
are matched like a ripped banknote, each piece being
owned by one of the two people, therefore in order to
access the message both pieces are needed. The idea
for this metaphor emerges due to the uniqueness of the
‘ripped’ pattern created when tearing a banknote. If two
people rip a banknote and each keep the corresponding
piece, it is almost certain that no other half will match.
Owl: Messages and calls with this person will be delivered by
your owl which will not share them with anyone else but
the two of you. This metaphor is somewhat based on the
traditional ‘mail’ metaphor used within cryptography.2
C. Analytic evaluation of metaphors
Alty et al. [14] suggest a two-fold evaluation of metaphors;
an analytic evaluation, and an evaluation that captures the
metaphors’ relationship with the underlying system functional-
ities (IV-D). The analytic evaluation is done by determining the
intersection between the system set S and the metaphor set M.
More specifically, it is based on: features that intersect between
the two sets M+S+, features of the system that the metaphor
does not cover M-S+, features of the metaphor that do not
correspond to any system functionalities M+S-, and features
that do not belong to either set M-S- [14]. The M+S- category
is conceptual baggage,3 which can lead users to incorrect
assumptions about the system functionalities.
Here, set S contains the functionalities of E2E-encryption,
whereas set M contains the processes of a metaphor mapped
to the system functionalities. The evaluation is done through
an adaptation of Brostoff et al.’s matrix [31]. Thus, M remains
the same, whereas set S is referred to as set E which signifies
the system in use, that is, E2E-encryption. The properties of
the matrix are shown in Table IV.
Each metaphor is ranked qualitatively on the Metaphor
Evaluation Matrix. Two researchers rank each separately in
order to avoid favouring a particular metaphor. The elimination
is based on the metaphors’ coverage of system functionalities.
However, set M+E-, i.e. ‘conceptual baggage’ also affects the
elimination process. Even if a metaphor covers the majority of
the system functionalities, a high level of conceptual baggage
will likely lead to an inefficient use of the system [10]. In
2It is also significantly inspired by the ‘Harry Potter’ universe by J.K.
Rowling, which are characteristic to British culture.
3“Conceptual baggage can be thought of as features of a metaphor that are
not utilised in a particular metaphor-system pairing” [30, p. 4].
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E2E-encryption and supported by
the metaphor.




E2E-encryption but not supported
by the metaphor.





Features implied by the metaphor
but not supported by
E2E-encryption: Conceptual
baggage
Leads to user errors.
Not important
Features not implied by the
metaphor and not supported by
E2E-encryption.
addition to the new metaphors, we analytically evaluate two
existing descriptions used in E2E-encrypted messaging apps.
We choose these descriptions based on the popularity and user
adoption of the tools in which they are used.
Telegram/Viber: Secret chats have/use end-to-end encryp-
tion. - This metaphor shows up both on Telegram and
Viber when creating secret chats.
WhatsApp: Messages to this chat and calls are now secured
with end-to-end encryption, which means WhatsApp and
third parties can’t read or listen to them. - This metaphor
shows up on WhatsApp conversations after tapping the
initial description for ‘more information’. The initial
description (“Messages to this chat and calls are now
secured with end-to-end encryption”) is almost identical
to Telegram/Viber. Therefore, we decide to include the ex-
tended version to see whether it cues better understanding
in users.
The metaphors that score highest on the matrix are Special
Language and Colours (both equally). Treasure Hunt, Ban-
knote and Owl cover the same number of functionalities but
differ in terms of which functionalities are represented and
on potential conceptual baggage. The conceptual baggage is
derived intuitively and is therefore inconclusive. Following
the matrix elimination, the three metaphors that we choose to
evaluate further are Special Language, Colours, and Treasure
Hunt. Specifically, their conceptual baggage is as follows:
• Special Language — users may think that the special
language is picked from a set of widely spoken languages
• Colours — colours do not usually unmix well
• Treasure Hunt — messages and phone-calls appear to be
hidden
In addition, we evaluate the existing metaphors for Tele-
gram/Viber and WhatsApp. Telegram/Viber scores worse on
the matrix than the disqualified new metaphors Banknote and
Owl, but produces an equal amount of conceptual baggage.
WhatsApp scores better than Telegram/Viber in terms of
functionality coverage but has the same level of conceptual
baggage. The conceptual baggage that we identify is:
• Telegram/Viber — (1) the word encryption is overloaded
in pop culture with movie references of magic and
science-fiction which may mislead users’ understanding
of it, (2) the wording secret chat is misleading, and (3)
users may associate the security of the chat with Telegram
















































Special Language 3 3 3 3 3 3
Treasure Hunt 3 7 7 3 3 3
Colours 3 3 3 3 3 3
Banknote 7 7 3 3 3 33
Owl 3 7 3 3 7 33
Telegram/Viber 7 7 3 7 7 333
WhatsApp 3 7 3 3 7 33
or Viber itself rather than the functionalities of E2E-
encryption.
• WhatsApp — (1) users may associate the word encryption
with movie references which are unrealistic, and (2) users
may associate the security of the chat with WhatsApp
itself rather than the functionalities of E2E-encryption.
Regardless of the analytic scores of the Telegram/Viber and
WhatsApp descriptions, we evaluate them further in order to
empirically compare them to the new developed metaphors.
Table V summarises the metaphor scores on the Metaphor
Evaluation Matrix. It ranks them based on conceptual baggage
and coverage of the five functionalities of E2E-encryption
(Safe Implementation, Confidentiality, Coverage, Transport,
Key Management) which are defined in Section IV.
D. Survey testing of metaphors
In addition to an analytic evaluation, the metaphors should
be tested through interaction with users [14], [38]. In order
to do this, we design a survey to test whether our new
metaphors cue better understanding of E2E-encryption than
the existing explanatory metaphors. Within the survey we test
the following metaphors: Special Language, Colours, Treasure
Hunt, Telegram/Viber, and Whatsapp.4 We use LimeSurvey for
designing the survey and the crowd-sourcing platform Prolific
for recruiting participants and distributing the survey.
As our study is purely observational and does not involve
any sensitive or personal identifiable data, it is considered a
service evaluation by our institution’s Research Ethics Com-
mittee (REC) guidelines and is exempt from REC review.
We target a population of users that reside in the United
Kingdom, and have heard of at least one messaging tool
that adopts E2E-encryption. The demographics that we have
collected are age, level of education, adoption of messaging
tools, and frequency of use.
E. Functionalities and Non-functionalities
To primarily evaluate participants’ current understanding
of E2E-encryption, they respond to four statements with either
true or false; two of the statements are functionalities of E2E-
encryption, the remaining two are not.
4To avoid biases in the survey we remove the words ‘Telegram’, ‘Viber’ and




• Statement 1: Only you and the recipient can read your
messages (True)
• Statement 2: Other people can send a message pretending
to be you (False)
Non-functionalities:
• Statement 3: Only you and the recipient can know the
messages were sent (False)
• Statement 4: If somebody hacks your phone, they will be
able to read your messages (True)
The purpose of the chosen survey statements was to test
understanding of E2E-encryption and simultaneously explore
conceptual baggage. Thus, Statement 1 (True) and State-
ment 2 (False) were chosen to reflect functionalities of E2E-
encryption. On the other hand, Statement 3 (False) and State-
ment 4 (True) were included as conceptual baggage because
they are non-functionalities of E2E-encryption. The latter
allows us to test whether the metaphors over-promise.
F. Survey Process
Participants followed the following process (a static html
version of the survey can be found in the supplementary data
as described in the final section of the paper):
1) Select which messaging tools they use and how frequently
they use them;
2) Respond to the four statements above (true/false, in
random order) in the context of using E2E-encrypted
messaging applications in general;
3) Read one randomly selected metaphor and answer
whether they have encountered the metaphor previously,
and if yes, where;
4) Repeat the step of responding to the same four statements
outlined above with true or false. The metaphor is still
being shown. This evaluates whether the metaphor cues
a change in the participants’ understanding of E2E-
encryption;
5) Ask for any comments or feedback.
G. Reliability and Validity
It is crucial to design a survey that is both reliable and valid.
Reliability refers to ‘the extent to which repeatedly measuring
the same property produces the same result’ whereas validity
refers to ‘the extent to which a survey question measures
the property it is supposed to measure [39, p. 6]. To re-
duce ambiguity in the deployed survey, we conducted several
rounds of revision of the questions and descriptions included
in the survey, showing them to several pilot participants in
each stage. Furthermore, we explore different ways of testing
changes in the participants’ understanding of E2E-encryption.
We give one metaphor per participant to prevent the result
of one metaphor impacting the result of another. In addition,
by measuring a change in understanding from their initial
understanding, we can test whether the results are dependent
on prior understanding rather than on the metaphors.
Unintentionally introducing biases is relatively easy when
designing a survey. We take a number of steps to ensure that
biases are minimal:
1) Only one metaphor is allocated per participant
2) The allocation of a metaphor to a participant is random
3) The order in which each statement appears is random
(both between surveys and within the same survey)
V. RESULTS
This section presents a general overview of the survey
demographics (V-A) as well as a summary of the statistical
results (V-B).
A. General Overview
We collect a total of 211 valid responses from the survey.
One participant is disqualified because of not using any mes-
saging apps and 19 responses are not considered because they
come from non-unique IP addresses. All five metaphors appear
in the survey: Special Language (39 participants), Colours (47
participants), Treasure Hunt (48 participants), Telegram/Viber
(41 participants), and WhatsApp (36 participants). From the
survey participants, 57 are male and 153 female. Their ages
range from 18 to 64 (average age 35). Two of our participants
had no formal qualification, 36 have gone to secondary school,
73 have gone to college, 72 hold an undergraduate degree, 24
have a graduate degree, and two of our participants hold a
doctorate degree.
Only 16 participants say they have seen Telegram/Viber
before and when asked where, their answers include: Facebook
(2), WhatsApp (8), BBC News (2), terms and conditions of
WhatsApp (1), Facebook Messenger (1), WhatsApp group
screen (1), and on a news site like BBC (1). Similarly, only 18
participants say that they have seen WhatsApp before and when
asked where, almost all answers are associated with What-
sApp (16), in addition to: in app description or updates (1),
Facebook (1), and Facebook Messenger (1). One participant
says they have seen the Treasure Hunt metaphor online. Two
participants say they have seen the Special Language metaphor
on WhatsApp. Two participants say they have seen the Colours
metaphor on a news story talking about encryption and on tech
websites discussing secure messaging.
B. Statistical Results
Table VI compares the changes in participants’ responses
to the four statements due to seeing the descriptions. The first
four rows indicate the difference in the number of correct
responses to the statements. For example, the first 12% indicate
that 12% more participants answered statement 1 correctly
after seeing the Telegram/Viber description than before seeing
the statement. Statistical significance is indicated by ∗∗ for
p < 0.01 and ∗ for p < 0.05, calculated by a Fisher’s exact
test. There are a number of interesting trends to note: in general
(and especially for the WhatsApp description), participants’
understanding of the applications functionality (Statements 1
& 2) were improved, while the non-functionality statements
suffered. The Treasure Hunt and Special Language metaphors
appear to be most balanced in the effect on participants
understanding.
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1 12% 25% 6%∗∗ 8%∗∗ 15%∗∗
2 0%∗∗ 11%∗∗ −4%∗∗ −3%∗∗ 0%∗∗
3 −5%∗∗ −11%∗∗ 4%∗∗ 13%∗∗ −4%∗∗
4 −12% −25%∗ −4%∗∗ −10%∗∗ −11%
mean −5% 0% 2% 8% 0%
negative mean −52%∗∗ −53%∗∗ −25% −18% −30%∗
changes 0.90∗∗ 1.06∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.60∗∗
This is followed by the mean of the previous scores
for each description. Here, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test was
performed, but no description displayed statistically significant
variations. While for individual statements the descriptions
show positively and negatively statistically significant varia-
tions, these variations balance out upon aggregation. Hence
we find no evidence that any of the descriptions give rise to
an improved understanding of E2E-encryption.
However, when we penalise descriptions for causing par-
ticipants to change their previously correct responses — in
effect undoing the existing mental model — descriptions 1
(Telegram/Viber), 2 (WhatsApp) and (less so) metaphor 5
(Colours) appear to cause harm (row negative mean, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test).
The bottom row indicates the mean number of responses
that participants have changed after seeing the metaphor (with
a maximum of 4). The mean participant has changed on
average 0.73 of their responses (out of a maximum of 4
changes, statistically significantly according to a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test at p < 0.01 for all descriptions). This confirms
that participants have changed their perceptions in response to
the statements, and that the results are not based on a small
subset of participants.
We also perform pairwise tests for each of the statements’
change scores. Here we find not a single statistically significant
result, indicating that in pairwise testing no description out-
performs any other (the sample size exceeds the requirements
for observing a medium effect size (f = 0.25) in pairwise
testing). This does not contradict the variations described in
Table VI, as those tests were performed in-sample. So while
there is evidence that some descriptions cause harm, we cannot
conclude that some descriptions actually perform better than
others in improving understanding of E2E-encryption.
We find a correlation between over-promising the capabil-
ities of E2E-encryption and this decrease in performance. Es-
sentially, the industry descriptions are more likely to make par-
ticipants believe E2E-encryption does more than it actually can
provide. The WhatsApp and Telegram/Viber descriptions carry
more conceptual baggage than the other tested metaphors.
Since baggage refers to properties of the metaphor not in
the system, this is one possible explanation. A hypothesis
is that the industry metaphors are more likely to influence
incorrect answers post-exposure for the two questions which
had a correct answer of ‘no’ (statements 2 and 3). The change
scores for these two metaphors and statements are: 0, −2 and
4, −4 (Table VI), giving an aggregate of −2. A Fisher’s exact
test supports the hypothesis with p < 0.01 and a large effect
(Cramer’s V = 0.55).
Lastly, our analysis indicates that there is no statistically
significant correlation between the participants’ age, their
frequency of use, and if they claim to have seen the statement
previously and the descriptions’ change scores, i.e. none of the
additionally captured demographics and app usage statistics
have any impact on the participants’ responses.
VI. DISCUSSION
The discussion includes three sections. The first discusses
how our results bear on our immediate research aims. The
second explores the wider importance of the work and use of
metaphors in explanation. The third presents limitations of our
work.
A. Revisiting immediate aims
Our first aim has been to generate metaphors that cue func-
tional mental models in users through a rigorous method. We
have outlined more actionable criteria for gathering evidence
about textual metaphors for explaining to end-users what E2E-
encrypted messaging apps can do. Although our process can be
improved and expanded in future work, our strength is multiple
modes of understanding user perception of E2E-encryption.
These multiple modes – interviews, analytic requirements,
and survey – enable a more complex explanation of user
understanding. Secondly, our survey provides evidence that the
explanations used in-app by WhatsApp, Viber, and Telegram
do not improve user understanding. Other explanations can be
better than these current ones.
From an experiment design and metaphor design perspec-
tive, we have confidence that our proposed method is better
than published alternatives. The design allows for three points
of constraining an acceptable metaphor – user descriptions,
criteria-based analysis, and survey of user understanding. This
style of carefully adding complementary constraints is similar
to how scientists arrive at adequate explanations for complex
phenomena [40]. Through these different kinds of constraints
and measurements, our method provides potential explanations
to why metaphors succeed or fail. These potential explanations
are in turn candidates for future studies and improvements.
In considering principles for studying security and privacy
from a user perspective, Krol et al. recommend – among other
things – to “think carefully about how meaning is assigned
to the terms threat model, security, privacy, and usability” [41,
p. 1]. Our work most clearly focuses on the meaning of security
and privacy. As noted in Section IV, studying ways to cue
accurate threat models in users is a potential direction for
future work. These are the attributes on which our survey tests
understanding. Based on the survey, end-users do not appear to
have the same use of the concepts as the technology provides.
The industry jargon-based descriptions have no impact when
mistakes are not especially punished, but do show a significant
decrease in the score of participant understanding when such
negative changes receive a higher punishment. This result
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implies that the metaphors are not improving understanding
of risk, but rather just moving it around.
It is unsurprising that if users do not have the same meaning
assigned to these terms as the developers do, there will be
problems. The user interviews support this claim that users in
fact do not use the words the same way. For E2E-encryption
generally, (1) participants do not know the meaning of the
system, (2) they give incorrect non-technical descriptions of
the system, and (3) they give incomplete non-technical de-
scriptions of the system. This state of participant understanding
helps explain why the metaphors based on technical jargon and
structural mental models do not perform well.
The most natural question is to ask why users do not have
the correct understanding. From the data we have available
here, there are a number of avenues which can be explored.
For one, other work has suggested that security concepts are
too complex to explain in a simple metaphor, certainly for the
purposes of risk communication [42]. Future work may explore
ways to address specific elements of how E2E-encryption
works which require functional contribution from users; that
is, focus on explaining correct user behaviours to enact, as
opposed to requiring users understand the system structure
correctly. This can be put into action by developing task-
action statements to test metaphors against when applying our
rigorous methodology.
Complementary to this, our results strongly suggest that
metaphors for security communication must be rigorously
tested. We found that existing explanations created by domain
experts fall short due to their attempt to engender structural
mental models, and this is not doable in the available space
and time. In addition, Sasse et al. [43] argue that the goal of
effective security can be achieved by considering the primary
task, context of use, as well as strengths and weaknesses
of users. These factors are still widely ignored even when
designers attempt to incorporate usability; they ultimately
develop systems based on their perception of what is usable,
where it may be more productive to focus on the mental models
and capabilities of users [44].
Furthermore, both new and old metaphors cause measur-
able harm to participant understanding. This harm appears
evenly distributed whether participant beliefs start off accurate
or not, and appears independent of participant experience with
the technology. Related works examining metaphors for E2E-
encryption (e.g., [13]) have not included in their methodology
design the capacity to check for negative impact upon partici-
pants’ prior beliefs. This omission creates a clear opportunity
for bias, in which researchers selectively measure positive
changes without checking what the collateral damage to under-
standing has been. Testing for harm as well as improvement is
a clear contribution of our own approach which we recommend
be adopted in future studies.
When asked about WhatsApp’s explanation of E2E-
encryption, interview participants offered comments such as:
“Because on WhatsApp...when you start chatting it’s
just...they just [said] that it’s an end to end encryption
but it’s not really like they give more explanation
on how they’re doing it basically. Just like talking
to people and at the end said that it’s like that”
(emphasis added).
Such statements corroborate and make concrete the failure to
improve user understanding that is evidenced by the survey.
Another point worth noting is that how well a metaphor
does depends on how much weight we assign to conceptual
baggage. This impact is particularly clear with Statement 4
(If somebody hacks your phone, they will be able to read
your messages). The WhatsApp explanation especially makes
people falsely believe their messages are secure at rest because
they have been encrypted in transit. Advertisers have an
incentive to emphasise the positive aspects and downplay
short-comings. A balanced understanding of the usefulness
of a technology requires just that — balance. However, we
hypothesise that one piece of conceptual baggage we identify
for the WhatsApp metaphor — the identification of E2E-
encryption with the whole of the WhatsApp software package
— is a candidate for explaining why this metaphor performed
so poorly on Statement 4. This hypothesis is an example
candidate for follow up work.
B. General Discussion
Transferring knowledge or understanding to novices is an
important aspect of usable security. We can view the task of de-
vising explanatory metaphors for E2E-encryption via work on
resituating knowledge more generally [45]. The knowledge is
local to experts, and the target audience is novices. The jargon-
based explanations essentially try to bridge the knowledge di-
rectly to the novices. The more friendly metaphors serve as an
intermediate generalisation which the novice can then attempt
to localise to their personal situation. Our method of both
analytic and survey-based evaluation of metaphors contributes
to methods for evaluating when a generalisation is justified.
Other methods of justifying a generalisation might use the
entities involved and what they do [40] or details of how
the knowledge was generated [46]. These modes of scientific
explanation can be considered analogous to functional mental
models, as opposed to the structural models more popularly
associated with science.
The question of finding an adequate metaphor for ex-
plaining encryption properties is not merely poetic. Humans’
conceptual system is largely based on metaphor, and “the way
we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very
much a matter of metaphor” [47, p. 3]. Therefore, orienting
novices with a helpful metaphor for E2E-encryption should
positively impact their use of the technology. An area for future
work includes testing this assertion, assuming a metaphor that
cues improved understanding can be found. However, our
results suggest that – even with improved methodologies for
testing metaphors – identifying a helpful metaphor may be
difficult.
Communicating complex models is a problem among sci-
ences as well as from experts to novices. Therefore, another
area for future work would be to test whether explanatory
strategies from a science of information security cue user un-
derstanding. A pluralist, mechanistic explanation style is better
suited to cue user understanding than the laws-based approach
often associated with science by security researchers [46]. Our
study is a part of a larger discourse on adequate ways to
communicate expert knowledge effectively. In this context, the
potential uses of our study method both advance beyond usable
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security and also, within usable security, go beyond messaging
apps that use E2E-encryption.
C. Limitations
Although we have used interviews with end-users to seed
our model of participant understanding, we have not directly
queried our survey participants about how they explain the
topic. Therefore, we do not have direct reports that could
inform why the participants answered the survey the way
they did. The secondary analysis of the interviews found that
interviewees struggled to articulate their understanding of E2E-
encryption (which is itself jargon-heavy). One natural avenue
for future work would however be to extend the survey, and
prompt survey participants to explain their reasoning about the
statements in their own words and how this was influenced by
the metaphors.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have contributed a method for evaluating explanatory
metaphors in usable security. We have tested this method by
evaluating existing descriptions and potential metaphors for
E2E-encryption. Our evaluation finds that existing metaphors
do not appear to increase user understanding of the func-
tionality of E2E-encryption, though they do appear to shift
misunderstanding from one area of functionality to another.
We have found we can design new metaphors based on user
interviews that have less conceptual baggage than those based
on technical jargon. The focus of our new metaphors aims to
avoid the dominant approach based on cuing structural mental
models.
The results for even our carefully crafted metaphors were
negative; they do not improve participant responses. Some
of our new metaphors – those which were generated based
on participant interviews – perform better, in that they harm
participant understanding less than the existing metaphors.
This result indicates structural mental models are likely the
wrong goal when explaining complex systems to users. Future
work would likely have more success if it focuses on cuing
functional (i.e., task-action) mental models. Furthermore, when
building and testing metaphors, the community should measure
the harm to participant understanding as well as any improve-
ments.
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